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COMMENTS 
THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT-AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT 
DECISIONs-"This is the Supreme Court of Michigan speaking, 
the possessor of all the historic powers of law and equity, the 
keeper of the conscience of our sovereign people, a constitutional 
court of plenary powers, not a legislative court of enfeebled and 
circumscribed jurisdiction."1 These words of Justice Talbot 
Smith seem to epitomize the attitude of the present majority 
toward the role of the Michigan Supreme Court as a court of last 
resort. It is the purpose of this comment to attempt to determine 
and evaluate just what the court's role has been. Attention will be 
directed to selected areas of non-statutory and statutory law, with 
specific emphasis placed upon the areas of contributory negli-
gence and workmen's compensation. 
I. Introduction 
The eight-man Michigan Supreme Court currently consists 
of Chief Justice Dethmers and Associate Justices Carr, Kelly, 
Smith, Black, Edwards, Voelker and Kavanagh. Justices Smith, 
Black, Edwards and Voelker were named to the court between 
1954 and 1957 and at that time joined together in several four-
four decisions, which automatically affirm the trial court.2 In 1958 
this deadlock was broken when Justice Kavanagh became a mem-
ber of the court and joined forces with the four newer justices. 
The effect of these personnel changes becomes apparent by study-
ing the history of two recent automobile accident cases.3 In both 
cases the trial judge gave judgment for defendant n.o.v. because 
plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence. In 1957 
both judgments were affirmed four-four. In 1958 both judgments 
were reversed on rehearing, five-three. Justice Kelly, dissenting in 
one of the cases, pointed out that there had been no change in 
the facts or the law, only in personnel. Justice Voelker, however, 
1 Consumers Power Co. v. Muskegon County, 346 Mich. 243 at 265, 78 N.W. (2d) 223 
(1956). 
2 See, e.g., notes 3 and 4 infra: 
3 Weller v. Mancha, 351 Mich. 50, 87 N.W. (2d) 134 (1957); rehearing, 353 Mich. 189, 
91 N.W. (2d) 352 (1958); Steger v. Blanchard, 350 Mich. 579, 86 N.W. (2d) 796 (1957):' 
r~hearing, 353 Mich. 140, 90 N.W. (2d) 891 (1958). 
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found "one other change," a change "in how a majority of this 
Court views the law."4 
II. Non-Statutory Law-Torts 
A. Generally. If there is a single theme which might be found 
running through the cases decided in this area it is this: the pres-
ent majority has indicated a strong tendency to remove obstacles 
to recovery. It has taken a broad approach toward restitution,5 
cast doubt upon a municipality's immunity from suit,6 adopted a 
rule akin to res ipsa loquitur, 7 indicated liberality toward the 
problem of psychic injuries,8 and favored a strict attitude toward 
imputed negligence.9 All this has been done to some extent in 
derogation of previous Michigan case law. Perhaps most signifi-
cant has been the court's approach to the duty problem in the law 
of torts. Justice Smith has gone beyond existing authority in at 
least two areas. In a dissenting opinion in 1956 he stated that 
there is a duty on the part of a creditor not to write his debtor's 
employer in order to coerce payment.10 In 1958 he wrote a major-
ity opinion stating broadly that a landowner owes a duty of care 
to a trespassing child.11 
A recent opinion of Justice Voelker also illustrates this 
point.12 The action was for breach of warranty in the sale of 
4 Steger v. Blanchard, 353 Mich. 140 at 141-142, 90 N.W. (2d) 891 (1958). For another 
4-4 opinion in 1957, see Wall v. Lunn Laminates, 350 Mich. 626, 86 N.W. (2d) 804 (1957). 
No rehearing was applied for here apparently because Justices Smith, Black, Edwards 
and Voelker agreed with the trial judge. 
Ii Consumers Power Co. v. Muskegon County, 346 Mich. 243, 78 N.W. (2d) 223 (1956); 
Janiszewski v. Behrmann, 345 Mich. 8, 75 N.W. (2d) 77 (1956), dissenting opinions of 
Justice Smith. 
6 Richards v. Birmingham School District, 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W. (2d) 643 (1957), 
dissenting opinion of Justice Edwards joined by Justice Smith. Justice Black concurred 
specially and refrained from discussing the issue. 
7 Higdon v. Carlebach, 348 Mich. 363, 83 N.W. (2d) 296 (1957). 
8 Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 76 N.W. (2d) 80 (1956). Cf. Lahar v. Barnes, 353 
Mich. 408, 91 N.W. (2d) 261 (1958). 
9 Sherman v. Korff, 353 Mich. 387, 91 N.W. (2d) 485 (1958). 
10 "But when one of our people buys a refrigerator on time, he does not thereupon 
hang the vestments of his privacy in his creditor's closet, to stand naked and exposed to 
whatever measures the creditor chooses to employ to collect the debt." Hawley v. Profes• 
sional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500 at 516, 76. N.W. (2d) 835 (1956). 
11 " ••• [T]he fact that the child is a trespasser does not now relieve the owner of the 
duty to use reasonable care ..•. " Lyshak v. Detroit, 351 Mich. 230 at 248, 88 N.W. (2d) 
596 (1958). This could be considered dictum because the defendant conducted a dangerous 
activity (golfing) after the plaintiff had been discovered. This is the ground upon which 
Chief Justice Dethmers concurred, joined by Justices Carr and Kelly. Justice Edwards 
concurred solely on the basis of tlle quoted language. 
12 Spence v. Three Rivers Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. (2d) 873 (1958). 
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chattels. The plaintiff's independent contractor had purchased 
building blocks from defendant. The trial court denied relief 
because there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and 
defendant. This was reversed on appeal, five-three. Justice Kelly, 
writing for the dissent, followed the traditional analysis: (1) the 
action is for breach of warranty; (2) there was no privity; (3) 
therefore the plaintiff must lose.13 Justice Voelker's majority 
opinion is less easy to summarize. He began by referring to the 
implied warranty of "merchantability"14 although the facts, the 
statute15 cited, and later language indicate that the implied war-
ranty of fitness for purpose was intended. He next expressed an 
inability to understand why privity should be an element of an 
action on a warranty yet not of a negligence action.16 He then dis-
cussed the exception to the privity requirement but found no 
reason why it should be limited to dangerous articles or food 
causing personal injury.17 Throughout his opinion the require-
ment of privity was criticized. Against this must be balanced Jus-
tice Voelker's reading of the complaint as stating a cause of ac-
tion in negligence.18 
B. Contributory Negligence. This aspect of the law of negli-
gence occupies a unique position in the common law of any jur-
isdiction. Almost completely judge-made law it is readily suscep-
tible to judicial change. Because of its almost daily application 
and its intimate relation to the problems of ordinary people it is 
sensitive to social, political and economic influences. Because of 
the accidental nature of the situations to which it is applied there 
is but slim possibility of reliance on the doctrine by the people it 
affects. It is not surprising that this area of the law should occasion 
more frequent expression of judicial notions of public policy 
than others. 
If the doctrine of contributory negligence itself was not such a 
device,19 the particular formulations of contributory negligence 
which grew up thereunder as a matter of law were conveniently 
ls Id. at 135 et seq. 
14 Id. at 122. 
15 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §440.15(2). 
16 Spence v. Three Rivers Supply, 353 Mich. 120 at 129, 90 N.W. (2d) 873 (1958). 
17 Id. at 130. 
18 Ibid. But cf. id. at 135. 
19 See Malone, "The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence," 41 ILL. L. REv. 
151 at 158 (1946). 
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adaptable to judicial control of plaintiff-minded juries.2° Char-
acteristic of these formulations was the Michigan rule relative to 
pedestrians crossing a street: 
"Under present-day traffic conditions a pedestrian, before 
crossing a street or highway, must (I) make proper observa-
tion as to approaching traffic, (2) observe approaching traf-
fic and form a judgment as to its distance away and its speed, 
(3) continue his observation while crossing the street or 
highway, and (4) exercise that degree of care and caution 
which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would ex-
ercise under like circumstances."21 
Similar formulae arose in a variety of other situations especially 
in the auto accident field.22 Thus a doctrine, conceived as a means 
of allowing judges freedom to decide cases in accordance with the 
flexible standard of due care, imposed upon its creators the 
shackles of precedent.23 When a case fitted any pre-determined 
pigeonhole the decision would not only be out of the control of 
the jury, it would be out of the control of the judges as well. The 
original members of the present majority swiftly recorded their 
dissatisfaction with this condition of Michigan law.24 When the 
crusading minority became a deciding majority, a new doctrine 
arose: the issue of contributory negligence is now to be left for 
the jury in all cases in which reasonable men might differ; rarely 
is a case to be taken from the jury.25 In making this change the 
majority relied on the following: 
(I) A passage from a decision by Judge Cooley26 em-
phasizing the province of the jury in determining questions 
of fact upon which reasonable minds might differ.27 Thus 
the majority has been able to point out that although it has 
changed the law, it has done so only in the light of pre-
existing principles.28 
20 See Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March," 28 Cm-KENT L. REv. 189 
(1950); Malone, "Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases," 29 MINN. L. REv. 
61 at 66 (1945). 
21 Malone v. Vining, 313 Mich. 315 at 321, 21 N.W. (2d) 144 (1946). 
22 See JAMIESON AND BROWN, MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE LAw, 2d ed. (1951). 
23 See McKinney v. Yelavich, 352 Mich. 687 at 691, 90 N.W. (2d) 883 (1958); 1954 
Wis. L. REv. 95 at 139 et seq. 
2i Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 84 N.W. (2d) 840 (1957). 
25 Van Gilder v. C. &: E. Trucking Corp., 352 Mich. 672, 90 N.W. (2d) 828 (1958). 
26 Detroit&: M.R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99 at 123 (1868). 
27 Gilson v. Bronkhorst, 353 Mich. 148, 90 N.W. (2d) 701 (1958); Cole v. Barber, 353 
Mich. 427, 91 N.W. (2d) 848 (1958). 
28 Shaw v. Bashore, 353 Mich. 31, 90 N.W. (2d) 688 (1958). 
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(2) The traditional rule that on appeal of a directed ver-
dict for defendant or a judgment for defendant n.o.v., the 
evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.29 By emphasizing this the majority has substantially 
weakened the contervailing notion that undisputed physical 
facts overcome the rule.30 · 
(3) The assertion that the plaintiff's actions must not be 
viewed as isolated conduct but rather in the framework of 
the total situation, including the defendant's negligence;31 
due care by plaintiff does not include the duty to foresee or 
anticipate the negligent or illegal acts of the defendant.32 
(4) A belief that substantial changes in traffic conditions 
invalidate the earlier approach.33 
Closely related to the retreat from the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law is the unanimously adopted 
court rule shifting the burden of proof on the issue of contribu-
tory negligence from the plaintiff to the defendant.34 This shift 
creates a doubtful future for the presumption of due care ac-
corded a deceased party to an accident35 as it relates to a plaintiff's 
decedent.36 
At one time this shifting of the Michigan position appeared 
destined to become a radical departure from traditional notions, 
but the more recent decisions indicate that the outcome will be 
much more moderate than the heralds had portended. Such re-
sults should not, however, overshadow the fact that Michigan 
law on this subject has substantially changed. The effect of a jury 
determination of the ultimate issue -of contributory negligence 
with the burden of proof on the defendant should undoubtedly 
produce more plaintiffs' victories. 
20 Hoffman v. Burkhead, 353 Mich. 47, 90 N.W. (2d) 498 (1958). 
so Shaw v. Bashore, 353 Mich. 31, 90 N.W. (2d) 688 (1958). But see Van Gilder v. 
C. & E. Trucking Corp., 352 Mich. 672 at 684, 90 N.W. (2d) 828 (1958). 
31 Compare Ware v. Nelson, 351 Mich. 390, 88 N.W. (2d) 524 (1958), with Jones v. 
Michigan Racing Assn., 346 Mich. 648, 78 N.W. (2d) 566 (1956). 
32 Samyn v. Bublitz, 352 Mich. 613, 90 N.W. (2d) 711 (1958); Vandervelt v. Mather, 
353 Mich. 1, 90 N.W. (2d) 894 (1958). But see Landon v. Shepherd, 353 Mich. 500 at 
507, 91 N.W. (2d) 844 (1958). 
33 Krause v. Ryan, 344 Mich. 428 at 439, 74 N.W. (2d) 20 (1955) (dissent); Bartlett 
v. Melzo, 351 Mich. 177 at 181, 88 N.W. (2d) 518 (1958); McKinney v. Yelavich, 352 Mich, 
687 at 690 et seq., 90 N.W. (2d) 883 (1958). · 
34 Mich. Court Rule 23, §3a, adopted April 14, 1958, effective June 1, 1958. Reported 
352 Mich. p. xiii (1958). 
35 Shaw v. Bashore, 353 Mich. 31, 90 N .W. (2d) 688 (1958);, Steger v. Blanchard,: 353 
Mich. 140, 90 N.W. (2d) 891 (1958). · 
36 GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AqnONS 50 (1936). . .. 
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III. Statutory Law 
A. Generally. Neither the present majority nor the minority 
has developed a sophisticated technique for interpreting statutes, 
although the majority is perhaps more likely to appeal to broad 
sociological considerations37 or a presumption that the legislature 
intended a "just" result.38 Both groups have placed heavy reliance 
upon decisions from other states without establishing any con-
nection between those decisions and the intent of the Michigan 
legislature.30 On occasion the present majority has devoted con-
siderable space to a review of the legal history surrounding the 
statute in question, with largely inconclusive results.40 At other 
times it has adopted a literal approach41 and ignored highly per-
suasive legislative history.42 
One area in which some definitive pattern of the court's ap-
proach to problems of statutory interpretation has developed 
concerns cases involving statutes which have been previously in-
terpreted or amended. Four situations need to be considered. 
(1) The legislature enacts a statute, the court interprets it and the 
legislature leaves the statute untouched. In this situation it has 
been stated that the legislature did not by silence adopt the court's 
interpretation. The question concerns only the propriety of the 
initial interpretation.43 (2) The legislature enacts a statute, the 
court interprets it and subsequently the statute is re-enacted 
without change. In this situation it has been stated that the legis-
87 See Pazan v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 343 Mich. 587 at 592, 73 
N.W. (2d) 327 (1955) (dissent); Powell v. Employment Security Commission, 345 Mich. 
455, 75 N.W. (2d) 874 (1956). But see In re Smith's Estate, 343 Mich. 291, 72 N.W. (2d) 
287 (1955). 
38 See Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W. (2d) 97 (1957). The 
present minority has used the same reasoning. MacDonald v. Quimby, 350 Mich. 21, 85 
N.W. (2d) 157 (1957). 
39 See, e.g., Butterfield Theaters v. Revenue Dept., 353 Mich. 345, 91 N.W. (2d) 269 
(1958). 
40 Moore v. Palmer, 350 Mich. 363, 86 N.W. (2d) 585 (1957), followed in Kiefer v. 
Gosso, 353 Mich. 19, 90 N.W. (2d) 844 (1958). 
41 E.g., Kroes v. Harryman, 352 Mich. 642, 90 N.W. (2d) 444 (1958). 
42 See dissenting opinion of Justice Carr in Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 350 Mich. 
92 at 100-102, 85 N.W. (2d) 152 (1957). 
43 Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W. (2d) 97 (1957). Justice 
Voelker pointed out that the court which had originally decided the question was work-
ing with new legislation and lacked the experience which time had given the present 
court. Yet Justice Black was joined by Justice Voelker when he stated that a decision 
of the same earlier court was entitled to greater weight than intervening opinions over-
ruling it because the earlier court was closer to the legislation. Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck &: 
Co., 350 Mich. 92 at 95, 85 N.W. (2d) 152 (1957). 
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Iature has adopted the judicial interpretation. It is presumed that 
the legislature knew of the interpretation and would have 
amended the statute had it disapproved.44 (3) The legislature 
enacts a statute, the court interprets it and the legislature sub-
sequently amends the statute. In this situation it is presumed that 
the legislature intended some change in the prior interpretation.45 
(4) The legislature enacts a statute, the court does not interpret it 
and the legislature subsequently amends the statute. In this situ-
ation the court feels free to interpret the original statute to have 
the same effect as the amended statute. Here the preceding rule 
does not apply, there being no interpretation to be affected by the 
change; the legislature might have intended merely to clarify the 
law.4o 
B. Workmen's Comp·ensation. The Workmen's Compensation 
Act47 has not only been the most frequently interpreted Michigan 
statute in recent years, but it has also received the most compre-
hensive "treatment."48 As in the area of contributory negligence, 
the present majority of the court views its decisions not as changes 
hut as a return to earlier correct interpretations of the act.49 
I. Employment. "Arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment" has long been treated as a dual standard by Michigan 
courts.50 "Arising out of" has been construed to mean that the 
employment must be the proximate cause of the injury.51 "In 
the course of employment" has been interpreted to relate to the 
time, place and circumstances of the injury.52 
In changing the Michigan position from perhaps the most 
44 Jeruzal v. Wayne County Drain Commissioner, 350 Mich. 527, 87 N.W. (2d) 122 
(1957). 
45 See MacDonald v. Quimby, 350 -Mich. 21, 85 N.W. (2d) 157 (1957). 
46 Detroit Edison v. Janosz, 350 Mich. 606, 87 N.W. (2d) 126 (1957). 
47 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948), chapters 411 to 417, §411.1 et seq., as modified by 
chapter 408, §408.1 et seq. 
48 This "treatment" has not been exclusively judicial. The act had been amended 
196 times up to 1957. Sheppard v. Michigan Nat. Bank, 348 Mich. 577 at 631, 83 N.W. 
(2d) 614 (1957). 
49 See Barron v. Detroit, 348 Mich. 213 at 216, 82 N.W. (2d) 463 (1957). 
50 Buvia v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mich. 73, 168 N.W. 1009, 7 A.L.R. 1301 (1919); 
Thier v. Widdifield, 210 Mich. 355, 178 N.W. 16 (1920); Sichterman v. Kent Storage Co., 
217 Mich. 364, 186 N.W. 498, 20 A.L.R. 309 (1922); Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 -Mich. 8, 
296 N.W. 861 (1941). 
51 See note 47 supra and Graham v. Sommerville Constr. Co., 336 Mich. 359, 58 N.W. 
(2d) 101 (1953). 
52 See notes 47 and 48 supra and Mann v. Board of '.Education of Detroit, 266 Mich. 
271, 253 N.W. 294 (1934). 
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conservative53 to a position of leadership in the movement toward 
greater liberality, the present majority has not effected much 
change in the formal interpretations given the phrases "arising 
out of" and "in the course of" as used in the act. The majority 
continues to require a causal relation between the employment 
and injury54 although the element of proximate cause seems some-
what diluted.55 Instead of changing the applicable tests, the ma-
jority has achieved liberality by broadening interpretation of the 
word "employment." It has replaced the earlier "what he was 
hired to do" or "control" test56 with a rather complete catalog of 
activities at work.51 
An incidental effect of this sweeping definition of employ-
ment is a rather hazy merging of the dual standard. This merger 
is of little significance in the ordinary case because once the 
"arising out of" test is satisfied, satisfaction of the "in the course 
of" test is nearly automatic. There are two instances, however, 
when the distinction between the two tests could be of controlling 
importance. One involves the statutory presumption that an 
employee is in the course of his employment when arriving at 
and leaving his employer's premises.58 The other involves the leg-
islative pre-emption of an employee's common law actions against 
his employer for injuries occurring "in the course of ... his em-
ployment."59 In both instances "arising out of" was omitted by 
the legislature. 
2. Accident. The second interpretative difficulty involves the 
term "personal injury." In 1914 the court determined that to be 
compensable under Part II00 of the act an injury must be acci-
dental, and denied compensation for an occupational disease.61 
In 1937 the legislature enacted Part VII62 providing compensa-
53 See Pound, "Comments on Recent Important Workmen's Compensation Cases," 
15 NACCA L.J. 45 at 54 (1955). 
54 Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303 at 327, 91 N.W. (2d) 493 (1958); Stewart v. Chrysler 
Corp., 350 Mich. 596, 87 N.W. (2d) 117 (1957). 
55 See Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W. (2d) 516 (1958). 
56 Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471, 74 N.W. (2d) 1 (1955); Tegels v. 
Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 329 Mich. 84, 44 N.W. (2d) 880 (1950). 
57 Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471 at 475 (dissent). See also Wheeler 
v. Dept. of Conservation, 350 Mich. 590, 87 N.W. (2d) 69 (1957). 
58 Mich. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1956) §412.1. But see Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 350 
Mich. 92, 85 N.W. (2d) 152 (1957). 
59 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §411.1. 
60 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §412.1 et seq. 
61Adams v. Acme White Lead&: Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N.W. 485 (1914). 
62 Mich. Public Act No. 61 (1937). 
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tion for occupational injuries and diseases. The word "accident" 
did not appear in the basic compensating provisions but did ap-
pear in other sections and in the title. In 1943 and again in 1952 
the legislature amended the act and omitted the terms "accident" 
and "accidental" in fifty-two places altogether.63 The question 
presented by this legislative activity was whether or to what ex-
tent the accident requirement had been eliminated from the act. 
Early cases considering this question display considerable diver-
sity of opinion.64 Contrary to judicial statements that this prob-
lem has been finally settled,05 the cases evidence a greater differ-
ence of opinion than ever before. Justice Carr requires accidental 
cause throughout the act. Justice Edwards would not require 
accident of any sort in Part II but has given no opinion as to 
Part VII. Chief Justice Dethmers would not require any accident 
as to "single-event injuries," those not the result of aggravation of 
pre-existing physical defects. Justice Kelly would require only an 
accidental result in non-aggravation cases under Part II. Justices 
Smith and Black require only accidental result, but require it in 
both parts. This is gleaned from two decisions comprised of 
twelve opinions signed seventeen times by only seven justices.66 
Of the present court, Justices Voelker and Kavanagh did not 
participate. 
3. Aggression and Horseplay. One employee maliciously or 
sportively attacks another. In the ensuing activity one or the other 
of them is hurt. Can the injured one recover compensation? The 
old rules were fairly clear. In the case of malicious aggression: (a) 
the aggressor could not recover because the act specifically bars 
compensation for injuries occasioned by the injured employee's 
intentional and willful misconduct;67 (h) the victim to recover 
need only show that the assault was .incident to his employment.08 
63 Mich. Public Act No. 245 (1943). 
64 E.g., Hagopian v. Highland Park, 313 Mich. 608, 22 N.W. (2d) 116 (1946): Anderson 
v. General Motors Corp., 313 Mich. 630, 22 N.W. (2d) 108 (1946); Kasarewski v. Hupp 
Motor Car Corp., 315 Mich. 225, 23 N.W. (2d) 689 (1946); Brazauskis v. Muskegon County 
Board of Road Commissioners, 345 Mich. 480, 76 N.W. (2d) 851 (1956). 
65 See Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635 at 657, 83 N.W. (2d) 603 (1957). 
66Sheppard v. Michigan Nat. Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W. (2d) 614 (1957), a 
1-2-2-1-2-1 decision; and Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 83- N.W. (2d) 603 (1957), a 
1-1-2-1-2-1 decision. See also Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W. 
(2d) 516 (1958). 
67 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §412.2; Horvath v. La Fond, 305 Mich. 69, 8 N.W. (2d) 
915 (1943). 
68 Marshall v. Baker-Vawter Co., 206 Mich. 466, 173 N.W. 191 (1919); Schultz v. 
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In the case of horseplay the injured employee usually could not 
recover, whether or not he participated, because the injury did 
not arise out of and in the course of the employment.00 
The present majority has indicated dissatisfaction with these 
rules. In the case of malicious aggression it has stated that the dis-
tinction between the aggressor and the victim is difficult, if not 
completely unrealistic to make, and has indicated that very lim-
ited judicial review will be given administrative findings that the 
injured employee was the victim rather than the aggressor.70 In 
deciding a case in which the malicious aggressor question was 
clearly not before them, four members of the majority indicated 
that they would require something closely akin to premeditation 
to bar the aggressor's recovery.71 The non-aggressor apparently 
still must show that the injury was incident to his employment, 
but this requirement is probably merely an application of the ex-
panded concept of "employment."72 In the case of horseplay, the 
fact of horseplay will no longer bar the non-participant.73 The 
participant also will be allowed recovery where he can show that 
the injury arose out of and in the course of employment; again 
~is would seem to be an application of "employment" in its 
expanded connotation.74 
4. Conclusion. The majority has definitely indicated the 
general approach it will take in interpreting the workmen's 
compensation act. Previous cases had vacillated between two 
conflicting maxims of statutory interpretation: statutes in der-
ogation of the common law are to be strictly construed;75 reme-
dial statutes are to be broadly construed.76 Today there should 
be little doubt but that the latter controls. 77 
Yet even assuming that by liberalizing interpretation of 
Chevrolet Motor Co., 256 Mich. 393, 239 N.W. 894 (1932); Slusher v. Pontiac Fire Dept., 
284 Mich. 657, 280 N.W. 78 (1938). 
60 Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N.W. 857 (1918); Derhammer v. 
Detroit News, 229 Mich. 658, 202 N.W. 958 (1925); Jones v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon 
Foundry Co., 284 Mich. 358, 279 N.W. 860 (1938). 
70 Stewart v. Chrysler Corp., 350 Mich. 596 at 600, 87 N.W. (2d) 117 (1957). 
71 Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W. (2d) 493 (1958). 
72 Note 70 supra. 
73 Hollingsworth v. Auto Specialties, 352 Mich. 255 at 265, 89 N.W. (2d) 431 (1958). 
74lbid. 
75 E.g., Smith v. Wilson Foundry & Machine Co., 296 Mich. 484, 296 N.W. 654 (1941). 
76 E.g., Simpson v. Lee & Cady, 294 Mich. 460, 293 N.W. 718 (1940). 
77 " .•. [W]e reject ... [the derogation maxim] without qualification." Sheppard 
v. Michigan Nat. Bank, 348 Mich. 577 at 589, 83 N.W. (2d) 614 (1957). 
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the act the majority has furthered its overall policy, the manner 
in which this has been accomplished leaves something to be de-
sired. Although the opinions clearly apprise counsel of the 
majority attitude, they appear to do little to clarify the law. 
In place of a "3-2-2 monster" decision,78 the court now pro-
vides "settled" 1-2-2-1-2-1 decisions.79 • This is more than un-
settling to the lawyer, as it would seem to frustrate one of the 
basic purposes of the act-prompt settlement of workmen's claims 
at a minimum of litigation and expense.80 
IV. Conclusion 
Any analysis of the efforts and direction of a court of law 
must consider the approach of that court to the application of 
the doctrine of stare decisis in formulating its decisions. The 
American doctrine of stare decisis is not a rule r_1equiring strict 
adherence to precedent, a rule which is broken when a prior 
decision is overruled.81 Rather it is a broad principle flexibly 
adjusting two needs, the need for stability and the need for 
progress in the law. There is no problem of stare decisis if a 
court feels the prior decision to be correct. If a court feels the 
prior decision to have been wrong it must then consider applica-
tion of the doctrine of stare decisis by balancing the good and 
bad which will result from overruling or following precedent, 
a question of social policy. Generally a court will be more likely 
to resolve the issue in favor of following precedent where the 
area of law is such that reliance has previously been placed upon 
the existing rule. Typically this would be true as to the "vested 
interests" concepts which exist in property and contract law 
and to criminal law. On the other hand, where action has been 
taken largely without reference to the existing law, a court may 
78 Justice Black so described Beltnick v. Mt. Pleasant State Home &: Training School, 
346 Mich. 494, 78 N.W. (2d) 302 (1956), in Sheppard v. Michigan Nat. Bank, 348 Mich. 
577 at 579, 83 N.W. (2d) 614 (1957). 
79 See note 66 supra. 
so See Hill, "Progress in the Field of Workmen's Compensation," 13 DET. B. Q. 8 
(1945); LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §2.20 (1952); Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303 
at 309, 91 N.W. (2d) 493 (1958). 
81 The British doctrine is much more strict and consequently requires an extremely 
careful determination of the ratio decidendi of a decision. 17 Mon. L. REv. 462 (1954); 
'11 L. Q. REv. 196 (1955). 
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be less disposed to follow precedent. 82 This would be the case 
in areas of torts and workmen's compensation in which the 
Michigan Supreme Court has recently been so active. 
There seem to be two basic points in issue between the pres-
ent majority and minority of the Michigan Supreme Court. 
One concerns the soundness of particular rules. The other in-
volves application of stare decisis where a change in the rules 
may be desirable. Unfortunately there has been little or no 
clarification in the opinions as to which of the two possible dis-
putes a particular case involves. It is notable, however, that the 
minority most frequently relies upon Michigan precedents where-
as the majority searches more widely for its authority, citing 
not only cases from other jurisdictions but also relying heavily 
upon treatises and the Restatements.83 From this it might be in-
ferred that the minority relies on the inertia of stare decisis 
while the majority asserts the wrongness of the particular rule 
in question. It is regrettable that both groups cannot come to 
grips with both issues. 
The method of analysis employed in decisions by the present 
court often touches polar extremes. At times it is very careful 
to avoid generalizations.84 In other instances opinions are direct-
ed at a broad but non-decisive issue.85 Opinions of this type are 
frequently written by dissenting justices and might be explained 
as a matter of judicial advocacy.86 Nevertheless, considering the 
frequency with which such dissents have become law, a more 
thorough exposition of the problems involved would seem to 
be warranted. The decisions are frequently very long and padded 
82 Von Moschzisker, "Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort," 37 HARV. L. REv. 409 
(1924). But see Sprecher, "The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the 
Extent to Which It Should Be Applied," 31 A.B.A.J. 501 (1945); Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 
49 CoL. L. REv. 735 (1949). 
83 See, e.g., Bisceglia v. Cunningham Drugstores, 350 Mich. 159, 85 N.W. (2d) 91 
(1957); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W. (2d) 537 (1957). 
84 People v. Stoeckl, 347 Mich. I, 78 N.W. (2d) 640 (1956); People v. McFadden, 347 
Mich. 357, 79 N.W. (2d) 869 (1956). 
85 See, e.g., Justice Smith's dissent in People v. Robinson, 344 Mich. 353, 74 N.W. 
(2d) 41 (1955). 
86 Edwards, "Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Smith," 34 UNIV. DET. L.J. 81 at 
85-86 (1956); Moorhead, "Concurring and Dissenting Opinions," 38 A.B.A.J. 821 (1952); 
Stephens, "Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort," 
5 UNIV. FLA. L. REv. 394 (1952); Carter, "Dissenting Opinions," 4 HAsTINGS L.J. 118 (1953); 
Musmanno, "Dissenting Opinions," 6 KANs. L. REv. 407 (1958); Musmanno v. Eldredge, 
382 Pa. 167, 114 A. (2d) 511 (1955). 
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with quotations at length from the record, other cases and texts.87 
Often they are criss-crossed by dissenting and concurring opin-
ions. 88 It is of course comforting to the la-wyer to know that 
the court has threshed ~:mt the matter and consulted numerous 
sources, but opinions of this type are too frequently of little 
value to one interested in determining the precise rule of the 
case. One might even get the impression from the nature of the 
opinions that the present majority may be writing for posterity. 
Credit must be given to the readiness of the present majority 
to take a fresh look at the law and attempt to shape the ·law in 
a given case so that justice will be done. Certainly this should 
be the prime goal of any court, and the Michigan Supreme 
Court has, in furthering its conceptions of the judicial process, 
done much to achieve this objective. 
Frederic F. Brace, Jr., S.Ed. 
James A. Park 
87 Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 84 N.W. (2d) 840 (1957). "It seems to me 
that a lawyer or a judge should be able to reach the conclusion that five and five are ten 
without expounding the whole science of mathematics." Smith, "Judicial Opinions," 34 
M1cH. ST. B. J. 21 at 23 (November 1955). See also King, "The Number and Length of 
Judicial Opinions," 33 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 108 (1949). 
88 See note 66 supra. 
